Safety
Min TLS Version at the CDN vs the Origin
September 6, 2024
Min TLS version at the CDN vs the origin is which handshake the public internet actually sees: visitors terminate TLS on the edge, so origin-only 1.2+ never helps if the CDN still offers 1.0, and a bypassed origin IP still speaks whatever you left on the origin. Prefer TLS 1.3, keep 1.2 until old clients are gone, and turn 1.0/1.1 off at the hostname people type. RoastMyOpsec's free TLS check is HTTPS scheme and trust-store acceptance on the URL you paste — it does not negotiate min version, compare CDN to origin, or score missing TLS 1.3 as an F.
The practical difference
CDN min TLS is the product most users hit. Origin min TLS is the origin-pull and any direct-to-origin path (forgotten A records, staging hostnames, mail-admin panels on the same IP). Align both, then keep origin off public DNS if the CDN is supposed to be the only front door.
HSTS and a 301 to HTTPS still matter more for OPSEC than winning a cipher screenshot. A valid certificate on the name you advertise is the roast's TLS evidence. Mixed content and cookie Secure flags are separate findings.
How to choose based on what you shipped
Set the CDN (or load balancer) to TLS 1.2 minimum, enable 1.3, drop 1.0/1.1. Match origin pull so the CDN is not the only grown-up in the path. Government and many enterprise baselines treat 1.2 as the floor; 1.3 is the generation to offer.
Do not disable TLS 1.2 on the edge the week a payment iframe or old WebView still needs it. Do not assume a homepage roast proved origin-only hostnames.
| Option | When it wins | Watch-out | Takeaway |
|---|---|---|---|
| Min TLS 1.2+ at the CDN | Public visitors; the hostname in ads and sitemaps | Origin still on 1.0 via a leaked IP | The control users actually negotiate |
| Min TLS 1.2+ at origin | Origin pull and any direct hostname you still publish | Hardening origin while the CDN still offers 1.0 | Necessary, not sufficient, if the edge is public |
| TLS 1.3 enabled | Modern clients; fewer handshake round trips | 1.3-only while a partner still needs 1.2 | Offer it; do not make it a roast requirement |
| HTTPS URL + trusted cert | This visit works | Treating it as a Qualys cipher audit | What the free roast actually checks |
When origin TLS still wins the argument
Origin TLS still wins when employees, cron jobs, or a support vendor hit the origin hostname, or when a cached DNS answer bypasses the CDN. CDN TLS still wins for the campaign URL. You want both floors, plus HSTS on the public name.
A URL roast of https://www.example.com is an edge story. It will not SSH to origin or enumerate ciphers. Pair with HSTS vs redirect and do not expose origin IPs in public DNS if that is the design.
Common mistakes
The first mistake is TLS 1.2-only on origin and TLS 1.0 still on the CDN 'for old browsers.'
The second mistake is publishing the origin A record next to the CDN CNAME.
The third mistake is reading a RoastMyOpsec TLS pass as a min-version certificate.
What a URL roast can prove
RoastMyOpsec confirms the audited URL is HTTPS (or redirects to HTTPS) and that the runtime trust store accepts the certificate. It does not set or read a min TLS version at CDN or origin, does not list ciphers, and does not score TLS 1.3 as required. HSTS is a separate header check (missing or short max-age). The scan does not submit HSTS preload, does not score GPC, and does not run protocol-downgrade exploits. Align edge and origin in your provider consoles, then re-scan the public hostname.
Free audit the URL you own
RoastMyOpsec is a defensive public-surface roast: headers, cookies, sensitive paths, and more — no exploit payloads. Start with the free audit, then open the vault if the blurred findings look expensive.
Free audit nowFAQ
- Is locking TLS on the origin enough?
- No. Users handshake with the CDN (or other edge). Set min TLS there, and still lock origin so a bypass is not a time machine.
- Does RoastMyOpsec check TLS 1.0 at the CDN?
- No. The free TLS check is scheme and certificate trust on the URL you submit, not a version or cipher scan.
- Should we disable TLS 1.2?
- Not by default in 2026. Prefer 1.3 and keep 1.2 until you know the clients. Disable 1.0 and 1.1 at the public edge.